
Inflation: why you might be worrying about it more than you should
November 01, 2022People often misperceive inflation as higher than it is, especially when prices of everyday items are soaring, stoking the potential for unrest. What ...
The Economic Theory and Experiments Research Group advances microeconomic and behavioural frameworks through both theoretical and experimental methods. It is one of three research groups in the Department of Economics.
The Economic Theory and Experiments Research Group investigates decision-making, markets, and other socioeconomic institutions through both theoretical and experimental methods.
Our research has two key focuses. First, we develop theoretical models to study individual and strategic behaviour, the role of information in economic interactions, as well as the design of markets and institutions. Second, we design and implement experiments to test and refine theoretical models, while also providing insights to inform and shape policy. Some of our members contribute to both the development of theory and the design of experiments, aiming to create economic models with greater predictive power and practical applicability.
Our research spans a wide array of subfields, including the digital economy, industrial economics, competition policy, information economics, bounded rationality, mechanism design, networks, contests and auctions.
Claudia is an Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer). Her fields of research are Experimental Economics and Game Theory. She is interested in researching how non-standard preferences and cognitive biases affect strategic interaction. She is also interested in market design experiments, with a focus on school choice.
Xiaogang is a Reader. He is an applied micro-economist with research interests in Auctions, Business Economics, Digital Economy, Industrial Organization.
Maria Cubel is an Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer). She is a behavioural economist with a background as a microeconomic theorist. Her research interests are in the fields of Applied Microeconomics and Experimental Economics with a particular focus on Labour and Gender Economics, Public Economics and Contest and Conflict.
Xeni's research is in the field of Microeconomic Theory, specifically Industrial Economics, competition policy, as well as more recently working in the interface between market structure and finance.
Zahra is an Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer) and the Associate Dean Student Experience in the School of Policy and Global Affairs. Her research fields are game theory, experimental economics and mechanism design, with a focus on coordination games.
Sotiris' primary area of research until now has been in auction experiments, models of bounded rationality and applied game theory. In general Sotiris is interested in many, quite diverse areas of economics, ranging from experimental economics, game theory and bounded rationality to political economy, urban economics and trade.
Arina is an Associate Professor (Senior Lecturer). Her research interests lie in the field of microeconomic theory and applications, focusing on information acquisition in selling mechanisms, dynamic learning and competition economics.
Alessandro’s work produces both theoretical and empirical results, which are readily applicable to policy analysis. Specifically, it explores the epistemic conditions that influence decision-making processes, and the effects of information transmission on strategic behaviour. Alessandro’s research methods include game-theoretic modelling, experimentation, statistical and machine learning tools.
Sergiu's main focus is microeconomic theory, with interests in decision theory and behavioural economics. He worked extensively on a classical rational decision theory account of behavioural observations like loss aversion and probability weightings, which are summarised in prospect theory. The goal is to use a bounded rationality mechanism which, when paired with other regular/classical assumptions, predicts the experimental biases observed.
Klaus' research focuses on explaining the observed behaviour in experiments that is at odds with standard economic theory using noisy payoffs and other-regarding preferences in classical strategic situations like ultimatum bargaining games or dynamic versions of the prisoners' dilemma. Recently, puzzled about issues of corporate asset stripping and tunnelling in transitional economies, he has started to investigate the impact of private benefits of control of managers on the investment behaviour of firms.
21-26 July 2024
Co-organized by Benoit Crutzen, Maria Cubel, Giacomo De Luca, Giuseppe De Feo, Mariele Macaluso, Santiago Sanchez-Pages, Shanker Satyanath and Scott Tyson.
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5 July 2024
Organised by Claudia Cerrone
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11 June 2024
Co-organised by Claudia Cerrone, Dasha Celik, Maria Cubel, Clement Minaudier
A one-day workshop to bring together London-based researchers working on lab and field experiments.
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10-11 June 2024
Organised by Arina Nikandrova with QMUL colleagues.
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22-23 July 2023
Co-organised by Arina Nikandrova and Xeni Dassiou
This workshop brought together academics, policy makers and industry practitioners to share their perspectives on a broad range of topics related to competition on and regulation of various markets.
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If you are looking for a particular publication or author, please use the City Research Online (CRO) Advanced Search.
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Diamantopoulos, A. & Nikandrova, A. ORCID: 0000-0003-0131-4303 (2025).
Delegation of learning from multiple sources of information.
European Economic Review, 173,
article number 104981.
doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104981
Hening, A., Nguyen, D. H., Ta, T. & Ungureanu, S. C. ORCID: 0000-0002-3707-4738 (2025).
Long-term behavior of stochastic SIQRS epidemic models.
Journal of Mathematical Biology, 90(4),
article number 41.
doi: 10.1007/s00285-025-02204-1
Zauner, K. ORCID: 0000-0002-8605-5349 & Mykhayliv, D. (2025).
On Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Investment under Financial Frictions.
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 30(1),
pp. 803-810.
doi: 10.1002/ijfe.2942
Sontuoso, A. (2024). Mathematical Frameworks for the Analysis of Norms. Current Opinion in Psychology, 60, article number 101930. doi: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101930
Cerrone, C. ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723, Hermstrüwer, Y. & Kesten, O. (2024).
School Choice with Consent: An Experiment.
The Economic Journal, 134(661),
pp. 1760-1805.
doi: 10.1093/ej/uead120
Cubel, M. ORCID: 0000-0003-1502-1720, Papadopoulou, A. & Sánchez-Pagés, S. (2024).
Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment.
Economic Theory,
doi: 10.1007/s00199-024-01589-2
Alysandratos, T., Georganas, S. & Sutter, M. (2024). Disentangling Reputation from Selection Effects in Markets with Informational Asymmetries - A Field Experiment. Review of Economics and Statistics, doi: 10.1162/rest_a_01451
Fernandez, M., Mayskaya, T. & Nikandrova, A. ORCID: 0000-0003-0131-4303 (2024).
Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning.
Games and Economic Behavior, 144,
pp. 29-48.
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.001
Mayskaya, T. & Nikandrova, A. ORCID: 0000-0003-0131-4303 (2023).
The Dark Side of Transparency: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works.
Journal of Economic Theory, 212,
article number 105699.
doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699
Charness, G. & Sontuoso, A. (2023). The Doors of Perception: Theory and Evidence of Frame-Dependent Rationalizability. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(2), pp. 309-344. doi: 10.1257/mic.20210082
Backus, P., Cubel, M. ORCID: 0000-0003-1502-1720, Guid, M. , Sánchez-Pagés, S. & López Mañas, E. (2023).
Gender, competition, and performance: Evidence from chess players.
Quantitative Economics, 14(1),
pp. 349-380.
doi: 10.3982/qe1404
Yaman, F. ORCID: 0000-0002-5752-6922, Cubi-Molla, P. & Ungureanu, S.
ORCID: 0000-0002-3707-4738 (2023).
Which Decision Theory Describes Life Satisfaction Best? Evidence from Annual Panel Data.
Journal of Happiness Studies, 24(3),
pp. 893-916.
doi: 10.1007/s10902-023-00627-5
Che, X., Katayama, H. & Lee, P. (2022). Product-Harm Crises and Spillover Effects: A Case Study of the Volkswagen Diesel Emissions Scandal in eBay Used Car Auction Markets. Journal of Marketing Research, 60(2), pp. 409-424. doi: 10.1177/00222437221115616
Andrikopoulos, A. & Dassiou, X. ORCID: 0000-0001-5535-7793 (2022).
Bank market power and performance of financial technology firms.
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 29(1),
pp. 1141-1156.
doi: 10.1002/ijfe.2727
Cubel, M. ORCID: 0000-0003-1502-1720 & Sanchez-Pages, S.
ORCID: 0000-0003-2259-0745 (2022).
Difference-form group contests.
Review of Economic Design,
doi: 10.1007/s10058-022-00312-8
Che, X. & Klumpp, T. (2022). Auctions vs. Sequential Mechanisms When Resale is Allowed. Economic Theory, 75(4), pp. 1207-1245. doi: 10.1007/s00199-022-01444-2
Hening, A., Tran, K. Q. & Ungureanu, S. C. ORCID: 0000-0002-3707-4738 (2022).
The effects of random and seasonal environmental fluctuations on optimal harvesting and stocking.
Journal of Mathematical Biology, 84(6),
article number 41.
doi: 10.1007/s00285-022-01750-2
Georganas, S., Laliotis, I. ORCID: 0000-0002-8206-044X & Velias, A. (2022).
The best is yet to come: The impact of retirement on prosocial behavior.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 196,
pp. 589-615.
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.02.019
Velias, A., Georganas, S. & Vandoros, S. (2021). COVID-19: Early evening curfews and mobility. Social Science & Medicine, 292, article number 114538. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114538
Che, X., Huang, Y. & Zhang, L. (2021). Supervisory Efficiency and Collusion in a Multiple-Agent Hierarchy. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, pp. 425-442. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.003
Cerrone, C. ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723, Hermstrüwer, Y. & Robalo, P. (2021).
Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions.
Games and Economic Behavior, 129,
pp. 114-143.
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011
Che, X., Li, T., Lu, J. & Zheng, X. (2021). Deposit Requirements in Auctions. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14(4), pp. 465-493. doi: 10.1257/mic.20200206
Cerrone, C. ORCID: 0000-0003-1551-6723 (2021).
Doing It When Others Do: A Strategic Model Of Procrastination.
Economic Inquiry, 59(1),
pp. 315-328.
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12928
Sontuoso, A. & Bhatia, S. (2021). A notion of prominence for games with natural‐language labels. Quantitative Economics, 12(1), pp. 283-312. doi: 10.3982/qe1212
Garrett, R & Georganas, S. (2021). Auctions with Speculators: An Experimental Study. Games and Economic Behavior, 128, pp. 256-270. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.004
Hening, A., Tran, K. Q. & Ungureanu, S. ORCID: 0000-0002-3707-4738 (2021).
The Effects of Random and Seasonal Environmental Fluctuations on Optimal Harvesting and Stocking (21/05).
London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University of London.