Why We Need a Community-Based Truth Commission for the Ezidi Genocide?

More than a decade after Daesh/ISIS launched its genocide against the Ezidi people, we find ourselves in a troubling position: the genocide has been widely recognised, yet meaningful accountability remains almost entirely absent. This is why we are convening a Community-Based Truth Commission (CBTC).

There are three reasons why this matters now. First, the justice infrastructure is collapsing in Iraq, where many of the crimes took place. The dismantlement of UNITAD in 2024 removed the principal international mechanism for investigating crimes against the Ezidi people, leaving a critical gap in evidence-gathering and advocacy at precisely the moment when momentum should be building, not dissipating. Second, existing justice mechanisms have overwhelmingly prosecuted ISIS members for terrorism rather than genocide, leaving Ezidi communities in a state of recognition without redress. Third, survivors have been sidelined from the very processes that claim to speak for them. This Commission places Ezidi survivor-experts at the centre, recognising them as knowledge holders and active agents of justice rather than passive witnesses whose stories are filtered through institutional frameworks they did not design.

A traditional Truth Commission is typically established by a state or international body through legislation or executive decree, and usually operates to establish the truth of what happened and, sometimes, to promote reconciliation. However, no state has offered to establish a truth commission in the case of the Ezidi people, and many states are beginning to look away. A Community-Based Truth Commission meets this silence head-on: it draws its authority not from any government but from the community it serves, ensuring that survivors themselves set the agenda, shape the process, and define what accountability means on their own terms.

Some may ask why we are not convening a People's Tribunal instead. Both are informal mechanisms, but they serve different purposes. A People's Tribunal issues quasi-judicial findings against perpetrators. In the Ezidi case, however, the legal pathways for prosecution already exist: trials have taken place or are under way in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. While, therefore, the possibility and channels for justice for the Ezidi people exist, the political will to use these channels is fast disappearing. A CBTC is designed to generate pressure, producing an authoritative evidentiary record and concrete policy recommendations that can reignite momentum for domestic legislation, universal jurisdiction prosecutions and, possibly, the establishment of a dedicated international tribunal.

Above all, the CBTC aims to galvanise the political will for justice that the Ezidi people have been denied for over a decade.

Aldo Zammit Borda, April 2026